Boston University School of Law

Scholarly Commons at Boston University School of Law
Faculty Scholarship
2018

A ‘Bad Rap’: R. v. Skeete and the Admissibility of Rap Lyric
Evidence
Ngozi Okidegbe

Follow this and additional works at: https://scholarship.law.bu.edu/faculty_scholarship
Part of the Criminal Law Commons, Criminal Procedure Commons, Entertainment, Arts, and Sports
Law Commons, and the Evidence Commons

Benjamin N. Cardozo School of Law · Yeshiva University
Jacob Burns Institute for Advanced Legal Studies
September 3, 2019
Faculty Research Paper No. 586

A ‘Bad Rap’: R. v. Skeete and the
Admissibility of Rap Lyric Evidence
66 CRIM. L.Q. 294 (2018)

Ngozi Okidegbe
Harold A. Stevens Visiting Assistant Professor
Cardozo Law School
55 Fifth Avenue
New York, NY 10003
212-790-0207
ngozi.okidegbe@yu.edu

This paper can be downloaded without charge from the
Social Science Research Network Electronic Paper Collection

Electronic copy available at: https://ssrn.com/abstract=3370335

July 2018 – Draft Article

[This is a draft article. Please do not cite. The final and published version is available in the
Criminal Law Quarterly]

A ‘BAD RAP’: R. V. SKEETE AND THE ADMISSIBILITY OF RAP LYRIC EVIDENCE

Electroniccopy
copyavailable
available at:
at: https://ssrn.com/abstract=3370335
Electronic
https://ssrn.com/abstract=3370335

July 2018 – Draft Article

INTRODUCTION
The use of accused-authored rap lyric evidence is no longer rare in Canadian criminal proceedings.
Adduced by Crown prosecutors, rap lyrics written or co-written by an accused are increasingly
used in criminal trials as evidence of the accused’s intent, knowledge, motive, identity, or
confession to the commission of the specific offence charged. The practice is not without
controversy.1 The introduction of an accused’s artistic work in the form of rap lyrics at trial
engages trial fairness concerns. Without a keen awareness of the social and cultural context that
produces rap music, trial actors risk inflating their probative value and underestimating their
prejudicial effect. The 2015 Ontario Superior Court of Justice decision in Campbell2 attempted to
redress this problem by proposing a specific rule governing the admissibility of rap lyric evidence.
Under this rule, rap lyrics would have to have a concrete nexus to the offence charged before those
lyrics could be admissible at trial. This rule was not adopted by the Ontario Court of Appeal. In its
2017 Skeete3 decision, the Court instead held that rap lyric evidence is admissible where relevant,
material, and not excluded by a specific rule of evidence. 4 On this basis, the Court found that an
accused-authored rap lyric was admissible and properly before the jury at trial. 5 By failing to adopt
a rap specific approach to the admissibility of rap lyric evidence, the decision represents a troubling
paradigm for the reception of accused-authored rap lyric evidence.
This article analyses the current evidentiary threshold for the reception of accused-authored rap
lyric evidence. 6 It argues that the current threshold jeopardizes trial fairness by allowing the Crown
to adduce highly prejudicial rap lyric evidence at trial. It proceeds in three parts: Part I provides a
contextualization of the issues. Part II examines the Campbell decision. Part III evaluates how the
Skeete decision differs from Campbell, and provides a relatively low admissibility threshold for
accused-authored rap lyric evidence. This article concludes by advocating for the adoption of the
Campbell approach with modifications.

*

Ngozi Okidegbe is a LL.M. Candidate at Columbia Law School and holds a B.C.L./LL.B from McGill Faculty of
Law. The views expressed in the article are her own. She thanks Michael Shortt and Philip Brink for helpful comments
on earlier drafts.
1
See, David M. Tanovich, “R. v. Campbell: Rethinking the Admissibility of Rap Lyrics in Criminal Cases” (2015)
24 C.R. (7th) 27. For articles pertaining to the controversy surrounding the use of rap lyric evidence in the United
States context, see Andrea L. Dennis, “Poetic (In)Justice? Rap Music Lyrics as Art, Life, and Criminal Evidence”
(2007) 31 Colum J L & Arts 1; Sean-Patrick Wilson, “Rap Sheets: The Constitutional and Societal Complications
Arising From the Use of Rap Lyrics as Evidence at Criminal Trials” (2005) 12 UCLA Ent L Rev 345; Charis E.
Kubrin and Erik Nielson, “Rap on Trial” (2014) 4:3 Race and Justice 185; and Jason E. Powell, “R.A.P.: Rule against
Perps (Who Write Rhymes)” (2009) 41 Rutgers LJ 479.
2
R v Campbell, 2015 ONSC 6199 [Campbell].
3
R v Skeete, 2017 ONCA 926 [Skeete Court of Appeal Decision].
4
Ibid.
5
Ibid at para 195.
6
This article exclusively considers the implications of the Crown adducing accused-authored rap lyric evidence. A
consideration of the proper admissibility threshold for the reception of defence-adduced rap lyric evidence is beyond
the scope of this article.
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I.

CONTEXTUALIZATION

This section examines the threshold by which rap lyrics were admitted as evidence in criminal
trials prior to the Campbell decision. Before Campbell, there were at least 16 criminal cases in
which rap lyric evidence was admitted for inculpatory purposes.7
The 2005 Ontario Superior Court of Justice’s decision in Leslie8 was one of the first reported cases
to admit accused-authored rap lyric evidence.9 In that case, the Court admitted the accusedauthored rap lyric containing the words, “Got a back up 40 Cal Kel-Tec,” as evidence that the
accused had knowledge of and possessed the weapon used in the death of the deceased. In
admitting the evidence, the Court noted:
Therefore, in my judgment, it is open to a jury to infer from the fact that Mr. Leslie was in
possession of the rap lyrics making reference to a 40 caliber Kel-Tec, that Mr. Leslie had
knowledge about this homicide that had never been made public. I appreciate that the lyric's
contents are open to other interpretations, but in my judgment that is what juries are for.
Accordingly, I rule that that portion of Exhibit C that contains the lyric “Got a back up 40
Cal Kel-Tec” may be admitted into evidence and considered by the jury. 10
The relatively low evidentiary threshold to admit rap lyric evidence used by the Leslie Court
highlights the problems associated with the pre-Campbell approach to rap lyric evidence. First,
pre-Campbell jurisprudence tended to overestimate the probative value of rap lyric evidence, while
underestimating its prejudicial effect. For instance, important to the Leslie Court’s decision to
admit the rap lyric tendered was the view that the lyric proved that the accused had knowledge of
the murder weapon. This finding was made even though the lyric itself did not indicate whether
the accused knew that a .40 caliber Kel-Tec was used in the deceased’s murder. The assumption
that the lyric proved that the accused had this knowledge indicates that the trial judge interpreted
the rap lyric literally and as inculpatory, an error that, as Professor Tanovich indicates, many trial
actors make in assessing the probative value of rap lyric evidence. 11
The reason for this is that trial actors can lack the cultural competency to recognize rap as artistic
expression12 and to distinguish between a rap artist and their persona. 13 This problem can cause
trial actors to mistake rap lyrics for autobiographical depictions of the rap artist’s lived experiences
or personal knowledge. 14 However, rap lyrics are generally not authentic. Rap artists may engage
in hyperbole with fictitious personas to entertain, create art, and exercise their right to free speech.
Rap lyrics are no more likely to be truthful accounts of an artist’s actions than other artistic forms.
No one would suggest that Picasso’s painting Guernica was somehow evidence that its author was
7

Tanovich, supra note 1 at 30.
R v Leslie, [2005] OJ No 2539 (SCJ) [Leslie].
9
It is important to note that this point is made in reference to reported cases on the admission of rap lyric evidence in
which the utterance of the rap lyric itself is not the offence charged.
10
Leslie, supra note 8 at para 8.
11
Tanovich, supra note 1 at 40; Kubrin and Nielson, supra note 1 at 204.
12
In the context of assessing the probative value of rap lyric evidence, Tanovich defines cultural competency as such
“Cultural competence, in this context, requires an understanding of the origins and nature of rap music.”: Tanovich,
supra note 1 at 40.
13
Wilson, supra note 1 at 356-357.
14
Dennis, supra note 1 at 15.
8
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implicated in that war crime. As a result, the contents of rap songs will lack the reliability and
credibility criteria required to be probative or even relevant in most cases. As Professor David
Tanovich warns:
[Courts] must carefully scrutinize prosecutorial claims of probative value and ensure that
they do not overestimate the meaning or value of the evidence given the nature of rap music
and concerns associated with using artistic expression as criminal evidence. 15
The tendency to overestimate its probative value also explains the reluctance of courts in the preCampbell era to exercise their residual discretion to exclude highly prejudicial rap lyric evidence,
even where the rap lyric evidence bore little to no connection to the offence charged. In this respect,
the 2013 Ontario Superior Court of Justice decision in Williams16 is illustrative. In this case, the
Crown sought to admit six accused-authored rap videos and their transcriptions as evidence of
motive and gang affiliation. On the Crown’s theory of the case, the rap videos showed that the two
accused, Williams and Mills, had killed the deceased because of his membership in a rival gang
and his involvement in the death of their gang associate. Both defence counsel contested the
Crown’s application on the basis that the rap videos and lyrics were highly prejudicial. In the
alternative, counsel for Williams sought the exclusion of specific verses of the rap songs tendered
that were highly violent and unnecessary to the Crown’s case. The Williams Court rejected both
arguments and admitted the rap songs without requiring the redaction of violent verses that made
no mention of a killing, gang affiliation, or the motive alleged by the Crown. 17
Another example is the 2013 decision in Evans18, where the Ontario Superior Court of Justice
admitted an accused-authored rap lyric containing the words, “we do it for the paper rush, yeah
it’s all about the dough, getting money,” as evidence of motive to commit a drug trafficking
offence, when neither drugs nor drug trafficking were mentioned in the lyric.19 Finally, in Leslie,
the lyric “Got a back up 40 Cal Kel-Tec” was introduced as evidence of the accused’s knowledge
of the murder weapon, when the lyric itself made no reference to the murder.
It is important to note that the problems associated with the judicial treatment of rap lyric evidence
in pre-Campbell jurisprudence appear to begin with Leslie. 20 Prior to Leslie, there are at least two
15

Tanovich, supra note 1 at 38.
R v Williams, 2013 ONSC 1076 [Williams] (an addendum to these reasons are reported as R v Williams, 2013 ONSC
3100). It should be noted that Williams is currently on appeal to the Ontario Court of Appeal.
17
For instance, defence counsel for Williams objected to the admission of the following verse in one of the accusedauthored rap songs: “30 30 mean machine Hitch you you cant stop it your [N-word] be runnin while were laughin and
tauntin backin out and dumpins is what were doin if your plotin skeemin were just gonna half to leave you bleedin[.].”
Her argument was that the lyric was irrelevant to the Crown’s case and too violent to be admitted. In rejecting defence
counsel’s position, Justice Clark states in R v Williams, 2013 ONSC 3100 at para 96:
The words, “30 30 mean machine Hitch you you cant stop it your [N-word] be runnin while were laughin
and tauntin backin out and dumpins is what were doin if your plotin skeemin were just gonna half to leave
you bleedin…”, demonstrate not only animus, but also that the author’s hostility includes violent thoughts.
18
R v Evans, 2013 ONSC 2447. That case concerned six accused on trial for various drug offences, firearms offences,
conspiracies and criminal organization offences. The accused-authored lyric tendered was the chorus of a rap
performance in which one of the accused, Shane Evans and a non-accused person, were principal rappers.
19
Ibid at paras 98, 108-110. It should be noted that in finding the lyric admissible, the Court held that lyric was
admissible as evidence against Evans and not the other accused.
20
It is important to note that this point is made in reference to reported cases on the admission of rap lyric evidence.
16
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reported cases in which courts problematized the reception of accused-authored rap lyric evidence.
In Bernardo21, the Crown unsuccessfully sought to admit a number of accused-authored rap songs
containing “blunt, graphic and on occasion violent” lyrics as evidence of the accused’s intent and
motive to kill. 22 On the Crown’s theory of the case, the songs depicted the accused as “a kidnapper,
a rapist and a killer.”23 The Ontario Court (General Division) refused to admit the evidence on the
basis that the lyrics were irrelevant and highly prejudicial. The Court held that:
At this stage in the proceedings, I am far from convinced that the relevance of the audio
tape “Deadly Innocence” or the accompanying one hundred and sixty selected pages of
jottings, words, titles, designs, to go with the rap music is relevant to the degree that [its
probative value] outweighs the prejudice that would probably flow from the admission of
the tape and the writings. Subject to issues arising in the trial that would make this tape and
material relevant to the extent that its probity would outweigh its prejudicial effect, I am
not at this time prepared to find the items admissible. 24
The dissent in Simard25 reached a similar result. In that case, the dissent held that the trial judge
erred in admitting the accused-authored rap lyrics on its own motion for the reason that the lyrics
amounted to inadmissible propensity evidence. 26 Justice Fish noted:
The respondent is correct in pleading the following in his factum [translation]:
The respondent furthermore admits that the court took into account evidence of
propensity when it considered the lyrics of violence and attack engaged in by the
accused with respect to women in his compact disk. However, evidence which is
adduced solely to show disposition or propensity is, as a rule, inadmissible, unless
the probative value of the proposed evidence outweighs its prejudicial effect. (R. v.
B. (C.R.), [1990] 1 S.C.R. 717, 55 C.C.C. (3d) 1.) The trial judge should not have
taken this evidence into account as the lyrics of the accused on the “CD” have no
great probative value with respect to the central issue before the Court, being that
of the guilt of the appellant.
This is patently inadmissible evidence.27
On this basis, Justice Fish would have upheld the appeal.

21

R v Bernardo, 1995 CarswellOnt 7227 (Gen Div).
Ibid at para 21.
23
Ibid.
24
Ibid at paras 24-25.
25
R v Simard, 2000 CarswellQue 3691(CA).
26
It is important to note that the rap songs that the trial judge admitted in Simard were not tendered as evidence by
either the Crown or defence. Justice Fish notes: “It should be underlined that, in the absence of the parties, and without
their knowledge, the judge listened to the compact disk at an unspecified point in time during or after trial.
Furthermore, it is an exhibit which was not filed for this purpose, the content of which was subject to no crossexamination of any witness, nor was it even mentioned in the pleadings or arguments of either party.”: Ibid at para 19.
27
Ibid at paras 21-22 (as per Fish J.A.).
22
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The majority in Simard, on the other hand, found that while the trial judge erred in his
consideration of the rap lyric evidence, this error did not play a conclusive role in the verdict.28
The appeal was dismissed. The majority’s ruling was later upheld in a short judgment by the
Supreme Court.29
Neither Bernardo or Simard are mentioned in Leslie or other pre-Campbell reported jurisprudence.
There are two reasons for this omission. Bernardo was rendered by the Ontario Court (General
Division) and thus was not binding on subsequent Ontario Superior Court of Justice decisions.
With respect to Simard, the dissent lacks precedential value. This combined with the fact that
neither the majority in the Quebec Court of Appeal nor the Supreme Court in Simard articulated
an approach to the admissibility of rap lyric evidence explains why this case was not considered
in the Ontario Superior Court of Justice jurisprudence that preceded Campbell. In absence of
binding appellate court guidance, Leslie and other pre-Campbell reported cases set a low bar for
the admission of rap lyric evidence. This low bar highlights the importance of the Campbell
decision, which this article considers in the following section.
II.

THE CAMPBELL DECISION AND THE ADOPTION OF A RAP SPECIFIC
ADMISSIBILITY RULE

Pre-Campbell jurisprudence was marked by a low evidentiary threshold for the admission of rap
lyric evidence. This threshold was revisited in Campbell. This case involved two accused,
Campbell and David, who had been charged with murder. On the Crown’s theory of the case,
Campbell killed the deceased for commencing a relationship with his girlfriend while he was in
jail on other charges. As evidence of actus reus, the Crown sought to have the following violent
lyrics from a rap video, in which Campbell was one of the performers, admitted as a confession to
the murder:
I’m shooting three
Nah, I ain't slipping with my wifey never
One shot, leave your brains on your Nikes
Broad day anywhere
One shot, make you flip like gymnastics
No stacks [N-word], the way I make it rain
You got your shots [N-word], like you Max Payne
The Crown urged the Court to interpret the lyrics literally and pointed to several alleged similarities
between the rap lyrics and the murder charge: (1) the use of the word “wifey,” which supposedly
referred to Campbell’s girlfriend; (2) the reference to “Nikes,” which the deceased was wearing at
the time he was killed; (3) the mention of “Broad day anywhere,” which was consistent with the
fact that the deceased was killed during the day; (4) the stanza “One shot, make you flip like
gymnastics,” which was consistent with a witness’ account that the deceased turned and twisted
as he was being shot; (5) the use of the word “rain” in the stanza “No stacks [N-word], the way I
28
29

Ibid at para 4 (as per the Majority).
R v Simard, 2000 SCC 61, [2000] 2 SCR 911.
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make it rain,” which was one of the deceased’s street names; and (6) the reference to “You got
your shots [N-word], like you Max Payne” which was consistent with the fact that the deceased
was shot multiple times.
Judicial Reasoning
Writing for the Court, Justice Nordheimer refused to admit the accused-authored rap lyric
evidence, finding that the lyrics did not qualify as a confession. He also cautioned against
interpreting rap lyrics literally stating that, “As with lyrics generally, but especially when it comes
to rap, it is risky to take any word literally.” 30 Rap lyrics, he noted, often refer to drugs, guns,
shootings, and violence, which means that, “The mere fact that an artist records a rap with lyrics
that refers to such activities cannot be taken as an admission by the artist that they were involved
in such activities, even where the lyrics are used in the first person.”31 He concluded that rap lyric
evidence should not be considered to be a confession, absent other evidence establishing that the
artist is truly speaking about a personal experience.32
He then proposed the adoption of a higher evidentiary threshold that would govern the reception
of rap lyric evidence in a criminal proceeding, a threshold that had been set by the New Jersey
Supreme Court’s 2014 decision in Skinner. 33 Under this threshold, rap lyric evidence is not
probative of the offence charged absent a strong nexus between the specific details of the artistic
composition and the circumstances of the offence. 34 Courts are to evaluate the nexus between the
rap lyric evidence tendered and the offence charged in isolation from other evidence tendered.
Courts are then required to determine whether the probative value of the evidence outweighs its
prejudicial effect. Applying this threshold to the case, he found that the probative value of the rap
lyrics tendered was low, since the similarities between the lyrics and the circumstances of the
offence were generic and “common to any number of other murders.” 35 Furthermore, he found that
the lyrics’ probative value was substantially outweighed by the highly prejudicial effect that their
introduction would have on the integrity and fairness of the trial, an effect that even limiting
instructions could not cure.36 On this basis, Justice Nordheimer refused to admit the evidence and
dismissed this aspect of the Crown’s application.
The importance of Campbell cannot be understated. Campbell is the first reported Canadian trial
decision to problematize the admission of rap lyric evidence without first critically examining its
probative value and its prejudicial effect. By endorsing a higher evidentiary threshold for admitting
rap lyric evidence, the Campbell court recognized that rap lyrics are not generally probative or
autobiographical and that there are pitfalls associated with interpreting rap lyrics literally. Its
approach and endorsement of a rap specific admissibility rule recognized that rap lyric evidence
can substantially prejudice the fairness of a criminal trial. Furthermore, Campbell sets a clear test
for assessing the admissibility of rap lyric evidence. Unlike in Bernardo which is fact specific,
30

Campbell, supra note 2 at para 15
Ibid at para 25.
32
Ibid.
33
State v Skinner, 95 A.3d 236 (Sup Ct NJ 2014)
34
Ibid; Campbell, supra note 2 at para 27.
35
Campbell, supra note 2 at paras 23, 28.
36
Ibid at paras 28-29.
31
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Campbell provided a two-step test applicable for when the Crown sought to tender rap lyric
evidence. For these reasons, the Campbell decision sought to provide a robust framework for
balancing the desire to admit all evidence relevant to the offence with the need to safeguard trial
fairness and integrity. The approach set in Campbell was virtually followed in the Ontario Superior
Court of Justice’s decisions in Millard37, McCullough,38 and Ranglin.39
III.

THE SKEETE DECISION

As noted above, the approach set out in Campbell was not affirmed by the Ontario Court of Appeal
in Skeete. In this section, the article discusses the Skeete decision in detail as it pertains to the
admissibility of accused-authored rap lyric evidence.
Facts
In Skeete, the accused was charged with first-degree murder. The Crown’s case was that the
accused killed the deceased in retaliation for the deceased’s prior cooperation with law
enforcement on an earlier charge.40 In addition to other evidence, the Crown sought to introduce a
rap lyric from one of the accused’s rap songs containing the words, “Real [N-word] don’t crack to
the coppers, muthafucka.”41 The rap lyric was part of a song that recounted the harsh conditions
of the Toronto (Don) Jail, where the accused was held while awaiting trial on this murder charge. 42
The Crown urged the trial judge to interpret the lyrics autobiographically. On the Crown’s theory
of the case, the lyric showed that the accused had killed the deceased for breaching an alleged
communal ‘code of silence’ that prohibited community members from cooperating with law
enforcement. 43 The defence contested the lyric’s admission on the basis that it was inadmissible
bad character evidence and that its prejudicial effect outweighed its probative value.44
Trial Level Decision
The Skeete trial court accepted the Crown’s position and admitted the rap lyric evidence as an
admission.45 In rendering its decision, the trial judge found that the lyric was probative and relevant
to the Crown’s theory that the accused believed in a code of silence that he would kill to enforce.46
In rejecting the defence’s position, the Court found that the lyric was neither presumptively
37

R v Millard, 2017 ONSC 5275.
R v McCullough, 2016 ONSC 1014. It is important to note that while affirming the rap specific admissibility rule
set out in Campbell, the McCullough Court indicated that corroborative evidence should be used to determine whether
the nexus between the rap lyrics and the offence charged is strong enough to justify the lyrics’ admission. Its use of
corroborative evidence to determine the admissibility of rap lyric evidence represents a shift from the Campbell
approach, which evaluated the nexus between the rap lyric evidence and the offence charged in isolation from other
evidence. The McCullough approach was followed in Ranglin.
39
R v Ranglin, 2016 ONSC 3972.
40
R v Skeete, 2012 ONSC 1643 at para 7 [Skeete Trial Decision].
41
Ibid at para 6.
42
Ibid at para 16.
43
Ibid at para 7.
44
Ibid at para 8.
45
Ibid at paras 17-21.
46
Ibid at paras 15, 18.
38
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inadmissible bad character evidence 47 nor highly prejudicial. 48 Furthermore, in its view, the
prospect of the jury misusing the lyric was low and could be circumvented by the accused offering
an alternative explanation for the lyric in his own testimony. 49 In the event that the entire rap song
was played to the jury, the potential prejudice that the jury might misapprehend the song could “be
adequately addressed through a proper jury instruction. 50 On this basis, the Court admitted the lyric
as evidence of the accused’s murderous motive, even though the lyric itself made no mention of
violence, a killing, or desire to kill to enforce a communal code of silence.
It is important to note that in rendering the lyric admissible, the Court distinguished the Skeete
lyric from the lyric admitted in Parsons51, a case where a trial judge had improperly admitted a
violent accused-authored heavy metal song containing the words “Kill your fuckin’ mother”. The
accused was on trial for the murder of his mother. The song had been composed in collaboration
with other persons two years prior to the murder. In distinguishing the cases, the Court found that,
unlike Parsons, the Skeete lyric was probative to the Crown’s case, not inflammatory, not a
production of a collaboration, and temporally connected to the murder.52 These factors were
determinative in the Court’s decision to find that Parsons was not applicable and that the Skeete
rap lyric was admissible.
At trial, the Crown, in addition to other evidence, led the lyric and expert evidence from a police
officer regarding the code of silence.53 The defence sought to contextualize the lyric tendered by
filing the entire rap song as a trial exhibit and leading evidence by the accused on the meaning of
the lyric. The accused indicated that the lyric referred to the code of silence existing in the Toronto
(Don) Jail. 54 While subscribing to a code of silence himself, he denied enforcing adherence to it.55
Following a trial by jury, the accused was convicted.
The Accused’s Position on Appeal
On appeal, the accused argued that the trial judge had erroneously admitted the accused-authored
rap lyric as an admission. In his view, the trial judge had inflated the lyric’s probative value by not
considering the social context in which it was produced and its status as artistic expression.56
Furthermore, he argued that the trial judge had undervalued the lyric’s prejudicial effect by failing
to appreciate the racial stereotypes associated with rap music, specifically the perception that rap
is the vehicle by which young black criminals express themselves. 57 By allowing the lyric’s
introduction at trial, the trial judge increased the risk that the jury would improperly rely on this
unconscious anti-black bias when evaluating the lyric. The accused urged the Court to view the
rap lyrics as a form of artistic expression that was neither autobiographical nor probative of its
47

Ibid at para 16.
Ibid at para 19.
49
Ibid.
50
Ibid at para 20.
51
R v Parsons, 1996 CarswellNfld 298 (CA) [Parsons].
52
Skeete Trial Decision, supra note 40 at para 15.
53
Skeete Court of Appeal Decision, supra note 3 at para 126.
54
Ibid at para 129.
55
Ibid at para 130.
56
Ibid at para 133.
57
Ibid at para 136.
48
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contents and cautioned the Court against applying a literal interpretation to the rap lyric. Counsel
for the accused advocated for the Court to endorse a higher evidentiary threshold for the admission
of rap lyric evidence that would render rap lyric evidence admissible only where there is a concrete
nexus between the specific details of the lyrics and the offence charged. 58 Under this approach, the
rap lyric tendered should not have been admitted into evidence as it lacked the probative value
required for admission.59 The Crown resisted the appeal, arguing that the trial judge had properly
evaluated the lyric’s probative value and its prejudicial effect.60
Court of Appeal for Ontario’s Decision
The Court of Appeal in Skeete held that even though the trial judge erred in principle in assessing
the lyric’s probative value and prejudicial effect61, the lyric was ultimately admissible and properly
before the jury at trial. In rendering its decision, the Court articulated three important principles
with respect to assessing the admissibility of rap lyric evidence. First, the Court affirmed that rap
lyrics are a form of artistic expression that do not necessarily reflect the state of mind of their
author.62 On this basis, the Court found that the trial judge had erred by finding that the lyric was
an admissible admission without first considering the nature of the evidence, particularly that the
lyric was a form of artistic self-expression. 63 Second, the Court affirmed that the fact that an
accused can testify in his defence is not a relevant consideration when assessing the prejudicial
effect of rap lyric evidence 64 and it was an error for the trial judge to determine otherwise. Third,
though recognizing rap lyrics as art, the Court chose not to subject rap lyrics to a specific rule of
admissibility. Instead, it found that rap lyrics are admissible in a criminal trial where relevant,
material, and not excluded by a rule of evidence.65 Applying this evidentiary threshold to the rap
lyric tendered, the Court found that the lyric met these criteria. The lyric was relevant because it
could be interpreted as describing a code of silence to which the appellant subscribed to and would
kill to enforce. This relevance was further bolstered by the Crown expert’s testimony on the code
of silence.66 The lyric was also material since it assisted in establishing the Crown’s theory that
the accused had a retaliatory motive for killing the deceased. 67 Finally, there was no rule of
evidence precluding the lyric’s admission at trial given that it was not prima facie inadmissible
bad character evidence. On this point, the Court held:
The rap lyrics did not reveal the appellant as a person who had committed other crimes, or
who had participated in other disreputable conduct apt to support a conclusion that he had
a propensity or disposition to do the type of acts charged and was therefore guilty of the
offence charged. Nor did the lyrics refer to other incidents likely to cause confusion in the
minds of jurors. The lyrics reflected a state of mind, not an unrelated course of conduct.

58

Ibid at para 137.
Ibid at para 135.
60
Ibid at para 138.
61
Ibid at paras 178-179.
62
Ibid at paras 156, 182.
63
Ibid at paras 180-183.
64
Ibid at para 184.
65
Ibid at para 144.
66
Ibid at para 166.
67
Ibid at para 169.
59
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They were largely concerned with conditions in a detention centre and the conduct of the
persons confined there.68
Instead, the lyric qualified as an admissible admission with a probative value that outweighed its
prejudicial effect.69 In the Court’s view, the timing of the lyric’s composition and its expression
of a code of silence that was open to interpretation were determinative factors in the Court’s finding
that the lyric was probative.70 In finding that the lyric’s prejudicial effect was minimal, the Court
was persuaded by the lack of extrinsic misconduct contained in the lyric. 71 In its view, this lack of
extrinsic misconduct demonstrated that the lyric was not prejudicial. Additionally, any incidental
prejudicial effect that might have resulted from the lyric’s introduction had been circumvented by
the jury instruction provided by the trial judge. 72
IV.

PROBLEMS WITH THE SKEETE APPROACH

Though the Skeete Court of Appeal strongly cautioned trial judges against readily presuming that
accused-authored rap lyrics accurately reflect the state of mind of their author, its approach offers
a lower threshold of protection against the introduction of low probative rap lyric evidence at trial
than the Campbell approach.
First, unlike Campbell, the Skeete approach declined to root the admission of rap lyric evidence
on its resemblance to the offence charged, instead allowing for its admissibility to be dictated by
its relevance, materiality, and admissibility. In theory, this approach should guard against the
introduction of low probative rap lyric evidence at trial. However, this approach is ineffective in
practice as illustrated by pre-Campbell jurisprudence. For instance, even though the Williams and
Evans decisions proceeded on the basis that the rap lyric evidence is only admissible where it is
relevant, material and not excluded by a rule of evidence, the application of this approach in both
cases resulted in the admission of inflammatory rap lyric evidence that bore little to no connection
to the specific offence charged. Skeete itself also illustrates this problem. The Skeete rap lyric was
found material, relevant, and admissible as proof of the accused’s murderous motive, even though
the lyric itself does not mention violence, a killing, or a desire to kill to enforce the code of silence
set out therein. The finding that a lyric that made no reference to violence, a killing or an intention
to kill was probative of an accused’s retaliatory and murderous motive demonstrates the problems
associated with evaluating the admissibility of rap lyric evidence without first evaluating whether
the rap lyric has a concrete nexus to the offence charged.
The second difficulty with the Skeete approach concerns its use of corroborative evidence. 73 The
Court heavily relies on corroborative evidence to find that the rap lyric tendered was probative and
68

Ibid at para 173.
Ibid at paras 176, 186-191.
70
Ibid at paras 186-189; In the Skeete Court of Appeal Decision at para 187, the Court states that: “there was a
significant nexus between the lyrics tendered for admission and the offence with which the appellant was charged.” It
should be noted that the “significant nexus” referred to in the abovementioned paragraph concerns the timing of the
Skeete lyric’s composition and the lyric’s expression of a code of silence.
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Ibid at para 191.
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Ibid at paras 192-194.
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This article uses the term “corroborative evidence” to refer to evidence that courts may rely on to confirm a rap
lyric’s probative value.
69
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admissible. However, unless corroborative evidence establishes the truthfulness of the rap lyric
evidence tendered, such an approach can result in a misapprehension and inflation of a rap lyric’s
probative value. Skeete is illustrative of this problem. Important to the decision that the rap lyric
tendered was admissible was the view that the timing of the deceased’s murder, which occurred
shortly after his cooperation with law enforcement, and the timing of the lyric’s composition
corroborated the Crown’s position that the rap lyric was evidence that the accused killed the
deceased for breaching a communal code of silence. This finding was made even though the
temporal nexus between the timing of the deceased’s murder and the composition of the lyric had
no bearing on whether the accused believed in a communal code of silence that he would kill to
enforce. The assumption that the timing of the deceased’s murder proved that the accused had this
belief highlights the dangers associated with relying on corroborative evidence to interpret rap
lyric evidence. It also demonstrates that not all evidence that corroborates the accused’s guilt or
the Crown’s theory of the case will be of assistance in assessing the truthfulness of rap lyrics
tendered as evidence. Through its approach to corroborative evidence in assessing the probative
value of rap lyric evidence, Skeete unreasonably lowers the protection that had been previously
afforded by Campbell against the admission of low probative value rap lyric evidence.
Furthermore, Skeete’s use of corroborative evidence is inconsistent with the view that rap lyrics
should not be presumed truthful. The belief that all corroborative evidence can aid in deciphering
the truthfulness of rap lyric evidence is partially based on the view that the meaning of rap lyrics
can be gleaned from a literal interpretation. However, rap lyrics generally should not be interpreted
literally given their status as artistic expressions. As Professor Andrea Dennis states:
Rap music lyrics consist of constructed images, metaphor, braggadocio, or exaggerated
storylines. At times, a defendant-lyricist may incorporate the experiences of another - either
in whole or in part - into his lyrics. On top of this, the artist's effort to maintain authenticity
- to "keep it real" - creates confusion regarding what is or is not the truth about a defendant
artist and his life. 74
For this reason, applying a literal approach to rap lyric evidence will result in a misconstruction of
the lyrics and an overestimation of their relevance in a criminal proceeding. The notion that courts
should not interpret lyrics literally is not specific to rap music. The problems associated with
assessing the probative value of artistic works was recognized by the Supreme Court in Terry.75
In that case, the accused had been charged with fatally stabbing a man. The Crown sought to admit
an accused-authored poem referring to the killing of an unidentified person with a knife. The poem
was entered into evidence without objection at trial. On appeal to the Supreme Court, the Court
held that the trial judge had not erred by admitting the poem, but problematized the use of the
poem as evidence, stating that:
The probative value of the poem on the ultimate issue is not great. As a form of artistic
expression, a poem is not necessarily probative of the “truth” expressed therein; an author
may have any number of motivations for expressing him- or herself in a given fashion,
only one of which is to recite what he or she did. Moreover, this poem's connection with
known events is tenuous. No names were mentioned. The poem is undated. No details of
74
75

Dennis, supra note 1 at 25-26
R v Terry, [1996] 2 SCR 207.
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the “crime” described in the poem were provided other than a reference to the use of a
“knife”. At the same time, its prejudicial effect was considerable. The danger existed that
the jury would accept the poem's oblique factual similarity with actual events to infer
directly that the appellant was the author of both the poem and the events. 76
For this reason, the Court held that an accused’s poetry is only admissible where its probative
value outweighs its prejudicial effect.77
The rejection in Campbell of the literal approach to assessing the probative value of rap lyric
evidence may explain why the Campbell Court focused on the similarities between the rap lyrics
tendered and the murder charge in isolation of the other evidence tendered. By refusing to adopt a
similar approach, the Skeete approach is less able to guard against the risk that low probative rap
lyric evidence will be led at trial.
The final difficulty with the Skeete approach is its lack of appreciation for the prejudicial impact
associated with the introduction of inflammatory rap lyric evidence at trial. However, the
prejudicial impact of inflammatory lyrical evidence can be high. Its introduction can jeopardize
the fairness of a trial and increase the risk of a wrongful conviction. 78 In this respect, the Parsons
decision, which involved violent heavy metal lyrics, is illustrative. In that case, the accused had
been charged with the first-degree murder of his mother. The Crown sought to admit a heavy metal
song by the accused and his band as evidence of motive. The song had been composed
approximately two years before the murder and contained the following words:
You’re fucking crazy,
I was home one day trying to smoke my dope.
When the bitch walked in, I took her with a rope.
Ha, Ha, Ha, Ha. Yeah, Yeah.
Kill your fuckin’ mother, kill your fuckin’ father.
Stab once, stab twice. Ha, Ha, Ha, Ha.
Kill your parents.
You know who walked in and saw her lying on the floor,
He said what did you do?
I said I killed the whore.
Ha, Ha, Ha, Ha. Yeah, Yeah, Yeah.
Kill your parents.
He looked at me and said you’re fucking nuts,
So I drew my knife and stabbed him in the guts.
Ha, Ha, Ha, Ha. Kill your parents. Kill your parents.
Kill your fuckin’ mother, kill your fuckin’ father,
76

Ibid at para 29.
Ibid at para 28; Sopinka, Lederman & Bryant: Law of Evidence in Canada, 4th ed. (Markham: LexisNexis Canada
Inc., 2014), at 371.
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In R v Hart, 2014 SCC 52, [2014] 2 SCR 544, at para 8, the Supreme Court noted: “Experience in Canada and
elsewhere teaches that wrongful convictions are often traceable to evidence that is either unreliable or prejudicial.
When the two combine, they make for a potent mix — and the risk of a wrongful conviction increases accordingly.
Wrongful convictions are a blight on our justice system and we must take reasonable steps to prevent them before
they occur.”
77
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Kill your parents.79
On the Crown’s theory of the case, the song proved that the accused held malicious feelings
towards his mother. The defence objected to its admission, contending that the song was highly
prejudicial and inadmissible bad character evidence. The trial judge rejected the defence’s
argument and admitted the song as evidence of the accused’s motive, despite there being only a
tenuous connection between the song lyrics and the murder. Following a trial by jury, the accused
was wrongfully convicted of second-degree murder.
On appeal to the Newfoundland Court of Appeal, the Court found that the trial judge erred in
admitting the lyrical evidence, stating that:
When one considers the evidence as to the composition of the piece, the number of persons
involved, the type of music which is a recognized, if not widely accepted one … in my
view, there are some very serious deficiencies in its probative value. The prejudicial effect
is a very great one and, in my view, substantially outweighs whatever probative value there
might be. That situation cannot be corrected by any instructions which may be given to the
jury with respect to its consideration of it. In my view, the trial judge was in error in
admitting this tape into evidence.80
On this basis, the Court overturned the conviction and ordered a new trial. Shortly after the decision
was rendered, the accused was exonerated by DNA evidence. The Parsons case is indicative of
how the admission of violent lyrical evidence can affect the fairness of a trial and lead to a wrongful
conviction. 81
Important to the Skeete trial court’s decision to admit the lyric tendered was the view that the
Parsons decision was distinguishable. 82 However, the lyrical evidence in Parsons and Skeete have
important similarities. First, as in Parsons, the Skeete lyric was tendered as evidence of a
murderous motive despite the serious defects in its probative value. In Parsons, those defects
concerned the number of persons involved in the composition and the type of music involved. In
Skeete, the defects also concerned the type of music involved and the fact that the lyric itself bears
little resemblance to the offence charged. Second, like in Parsons, the Skeete lyric is highly
inflammatory. Even though the lyric does not explicitly refer to extrinsic misconduct, its use of
profanities, a racial epithet, and its pronouncement of a code of silence prohibiting cooperation
79

Parsons, supra note 51 at para 45.
Ibid at para 63.
81
Important to this decision is the recognition that certain lyrical evidence is so violent that its prejudicial effect cannot
be overcome by a limiting instruction. In certain situations, jury instructions are unable to cure the prejudicial effect
associated with a particular piece of evidence. This point is noted by Chief Justice Lamer in The Lamer Commission
of Inquiry Pertaining to the Cases of Ronald Dalton, Gregory Parsons and Randy Druken (2006). He states:
In my view, the recent spate of demonstrated convictions of innocent persons is proof that juries are not
always reliable. It is no longer acceptable for the criminal justice system to place blind faith in the perceived,
innate good sense of juries. Increasingly complicated jury instructions are not the answer. […] An important
response to this problem would be to raise the threshold for permitting cases to be considered by the jury.
The test for a Directed Verdict should be modified to allow trial judges to throw out cases where the evidence
can colloquially be characterized as “garbage.”
82
It is important to note that in finding that the prejudicial effect of the Skeete lyric was minimal, the Skeete Court of
Appeal Decision did not cite the Parsons decision.
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with the police risks playing on the biases that trial actors may unconsciously hold about rap music,
its authors, and young black men. As a result, rap lyric evidence such as the lyric admitted in Skeete
has the same potential to jeopardize trial fairness as the lyrical evidence admitted in Parsons.
Furthermore, the risk that admitting highly inflammatory lyrical evidence could cause a wrongful
conviction is particularly concerning where the accused is black. American scholarship
demonstrates that rap lyrics can prime negative racial stereotypes.83 For instance, in their study on
the relationship between anti-black racism and rap music, Professors Christine Reyna, Mark
Brandt and Tendayi Viki found that:
The stereotypes associated with rap and hip-hop are perfect candidates for legitimizing
anti-Black attitudes and discrimination. These stereotypes not only overlap with already
entrenched stereotypes of Black males as violent and criminal-minded but, more important,
they suggest that this behavior is completely under the volition of the offender. 84
When introduced at trial, the jury may unconsciously rely on these racial stereotypes when
determining the weight to accord rap lyric evidence. These unconscious views may cause the jury
to improperly view the rap lyric evidence tendered as proof of a black accused’s ‘heightened’
criminality or propensity to commit crime. The extent of this problem is encapsulated by a 1999
study conducted in the United States by Professor Stuart Fischoff, who found that the introduction
of a black accused’s inflammatory rap lyrics at trial unfairly affected the jury’s perception, even
where the lyrics had little connection to the offence charged. The study concluded that “the
defendant was seen as more likely to have committed a murder than had he not been presented as
authoring such lyrics.”85 On this basis, Professor Fischoff states:
Study results clearly indicate that showing participants the rap lyrics exerted a significant
prejudicial impact on the evaluation of a person, and particularly so when the person has
been accused of murder.86
The study highlights the prejudicial effect associated with rap lyric evidence by showing that its
inclusion can influence a jury’s decision beyond its actual content, especially where the accused
is black.
All of these reasons demonstrate the serious risks associated with introducing low probative value
rap lyric evidence at trial. The problem with Skeete is that its approach increases the likelihood of
this occurrence. It is difficult to justify exposing an accused to such a substantial interference with
his or her right to a fair trial. This is especially the case when the rap lyric tendered bears little
resemblance to the offence charged and when the corroborative evidence tendered in support of
its admission does not establish its truthfulness and renders the tendering of the rap lyric evidence
itself unnecessary. Furthermore, this combined with the fact that there are certain circumstances
83
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Ibid at 803.
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in which the prejudice associated with rap lyric evidence cannot be redressed by limiting
instructions demonstrates the relatively low threshold of protection that Skeete provides against
the risk of a wrongful conviction. However, Skeete provides fertile ground for re-conceptualizing
the test for admitting rap lyric evidence.
V.

WAY FORWARD

By not adopting a rap specific admissibility rule and by enabling courts to improperly rely on
corroborative evidence to admit rap lyric evidence with little to no resemblance to the offence
charged, Skeete perpetuates the problems associated with the admission of inflammatory rap lyrics
at trial. There are three potential approaches to correcting the issue presented in Skeete. The first
would be to prohibit the admission of rap lyric evidence in criminal trials (the prohibition
approach). The second would be to adopt the Campbell approach with respect to assessing the
admissibility of rap lyric evidence (the pure Campbell approach). A third option would be to adopt
the Campbell approach, but allow for the use of corroborative evidence in the admissibility
analysis, where such evidence establishes the truthfulness of the rap lyric evidence tendered (the
modified Campbell approach). This article advocates for the adoption of the modified Campbell
approach.
The prohibition approach would render rap lyrics inadmissible unless the lyrics are the basis of the
offence charged.87 Adopting this approach presents three difficulties. First, the approach would
prevent the introduction of probative rap lyric evidence that is not unreasonably prejudicial to the
fair trial rights of the accused, for instance, an accused-authored rap detailing his or her
involvement in the damage of public property. Second, this approach is inconsistent with the
Supreme Court’s decision in Terry, which holds that an accused-authored poem is admissible so
long as its probative value outweighs its prejudicial effect. Given rap’s similarities to poetry, there
is no principled reason to ban one form of evidence and not the other. Third, the approach
underestimates trial judges by presuming that they cannot develop the cultural competency
required to differentiate between fictitious and autobiographical rap lyrics. However, Campbell
contradicts this premise and shows the growing awareness among Canadian courts of the artistic
nature of rap and its contents. This growing awareness, combined with the evidentiary difficulties
associated with adopting a complete ban on rap lyric evidence, demonstrates why this approach
should not be followed.
The pure Campbell approach would require that rap lyrics tendered as evidence at trial have a
concrete nexus to the offence charged before allowing their introduction at trial. While the pure
Campbell approach would prevent the inclusion of rap lyric evidence bearing little resemblance to
the offence charged, it would also eliminate the use of corroborative evidence when assessing the
probative value of rap lyric evidence, since the probative value of rap lyric evidence tendered
would be based solely on the symmetry between the specific details of the lyrics and the
circumstances of the offence. The problem with this approach is that assessing rap lyrics’ probative
87
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value without first considering the other evidence presented can lead to an overvaluation of the
lyrics’ truthfulness. For instance, in Leslie, the Court’s decision to admit the rap lyric, “Got a back
up 40 Cal Kel-Tec,” as evidence of the accused’s knowledge of the murder weapon was based on
a .40 caliber handgun being the murder weapon, even though the rap lyric and other evidence
adduced did not establish that the accused had this knowledge. Given the weakness of a pure
Campbell approach to guard against such a result, this article does not recommend it.
The modified Campbell approach would adopt the rap specific admissibility rule advocated in
Campbell, but would also allow the use of corroborative evidence when assessing rap lyrics’
probative value. To prevent its misuse, this approach would impose two restrictions on the use of
corroborative evidence. First, corroborative evidence would only be considered where it
establishes the truthfulness of the rap lyric evidence tendered. Second, the corroborative evidence
relied on would have to demonstrate that the accused was rapping about a personal experience. If
the corroborative evidence is equally consistent with the view that the rap lyrics tendered are
fictitious, then the corroborative evidence could not be relied on. Adopting the modified Campbell
approach has four benefits. First, the approach follows the 2017 Supreme Court majority holding
in Bradshaw, 88 a case that concerned the use of corroborative evidence to determine the reliability
of a hearsay statement under the principled approach to the admission of hearsay evidence. In
rendering its decision, the majority held that trial judges could only rely on corroborative evidence
to conclude that a hearsay statement was sufficiently reliable if such evidence established the
statement’s accuracy or the declarant’s truthfulness. Given that rap lyrics are hearsay, the
Bradshaw approach to corroborative evidence is useful and should apply. Second, given that
corroborative evidence would only be permitted if it establishes the truthfulness of the rap lyric
evidence, the modified Campbell approach would guard against the use of corroborative evidence
that does not assist in ascertaining the lyric’s probative value. In so doing, the approach ensures
that trial judges only rely on corroborative evidence to conclude that rap lyrics are probative, where
such evidence indicates that the rap lyrics are likely autobiographical. Third, by restricting the use
of corroborative evidence in this assessment without prohibiting it, this approach would redress
the problems associated with the improper reliance on corroborative evidence illustrated in Skeete,
while allowing corroborative evidence where its use would enhance the court’s understanding of
the rap lyrics tendered. For this reason, the modified Campbell approach would better balance the
competing societal interests arising from the use of rap lyric evidence while guarding against the
reception of low probative rap lyric evidence.
CONCLUSION
Skeete demonstrates the need to rethink the current approach to the admission of rap lyric evidence
at trial. Its approach to the evaluation of rap lyric evidence allows for the admission of
inflammatory rap lyrics that can distort the fairness and integrity of criminal proceedings. When
this issue again comes to the attention of an appellate court, this article strongly urges the adoption
of the modified Campbell approach, or at the very least a rap specific approach to evaluating the
probative value and prejudicial effect of rap lyric evidence, thereby reducing the risk that low
88
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probative rap lyrics will be introduced at trial. In so doing, courts can better protect against the risk
that an accused’s conviction was solely due to a ‘bad rap.’
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